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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we use tax policy choices to illustrate and investigate
the more general problem of using uncertain parameter values in models to
evaluate policy choices. We show, for this tax example, how debate on an
elasticity parameter translates into a debate about policy choices, and
vice versa. To construct this example, we suppose that the choice among
four particular tax reform options is based on a single measure of
efficiency gain. We show how this gain from each reform depends upon the
elasticity of saving with respect to the net rate of return. Within quite
narrow and reasonable bounds for the elasticity parameter, we find regions








The optimal tax literature provides valuable rules for designing
tax reform to minimize the cost of distortions in economic choices. Yet
the theory alone does not provide guidance on whether, for example, current
tax rates on capital or labor are too high or too low relative to the
optimum rates. Without appropriate estimates of the underlying economic
parameters, the best direction for tax reform is ambiguous.
In this paper, we use tax policy choices to illustrate and investigate
the more general problem of using uncertain parameter values in models to
evaluate policy choices. We show, for this tax example, how debate on an
elasticity parameter translates into a debate about policy choices, and
vice versa. To construct this example, we suppose that the choice among
four particular tax reform options is based on a single measure of
efficiency gain. We show how this gain from each reform depends upon the
elasticity of saving with respect to the net rate of return. Within quite
narrow and reasonable bounds for the elasticity parameter, we find regions
in which each of three different tax reforms turns out to dominate the
others.
In the sections that follow, we briefly discuss the theoretical
importance of the saving elasticity in determining intertemporal welfare
effects of taxes on income from capital; empirical estimates of this
elasticity; the interaction of intertemporal distortions with intersectoral
and labor/leisure distortions; and the results of simulating four potential
tax reforms in a general equilibrium model that accounts for these con-
siderations.—2—
II. Efficiency and Elasticity Parameters
Consider a single commodity X, produced at constant cost P, and taxed
at the ad valorem tax rate t. If Eisthe compensated demand elasticity,
then the welfare gain or loss from the tax may be written as W(c, t). In
a partial equilibrium model where t is very small,
(1)
This equation can be used to measure the intertemporal distortions
resulting from the taxation of income from capital. When an after—tax
dollar of earnings is saved, it earns a return that is taxed again by the
personal income tax system. Additionally, if this dollar is invested
in the corporate sector, a separate corporate tax is imposed before the
return is paid out. These taxes raise the price of future consump'tiori
relative to the price of present consumption. The welfare cost of this
distortion may be measured using equation (1), where X and P are the
quantity and price of future consumption, t is the additional tax on future
consumption, and e is the price elasticity of demand for future consumption.
Discussion of taxation and saving has often centered around a different
parameter, n,theelasticity of saving with respect to the net rate of
return. Martin Feldstein (1978) has clarified two distinctions between ri
and .First,e reflects a change in X, the quantity of future consumption,
while r reflects a change in saving, the expenditure on future consumption.
If this expenditure is to remain constant (the case where n =0),then
quantity must adjust to offset any change in price. A zero saving elasticity
therefore implies a nonzero quantity elasticity. Second, n is usually
measured as an uncompensated elasticity, while c in equation (1) should—3—
reflect a compensated elasticity. Nonzero income effects imply further
differences.
These considerations can be used to derive a linear relationship
between c and n. This relationship points to a substantial error that
can occur from using n directly in (1). In particular, a zero saving
elasticity may be associated with substantially nonzero welfare costs
from taxes on income from capital. Estimates of the saving elasticity
are discussed and employed below, but our model always converts each
value of n into a corresponding value forbefore it calculates W.
We calculate the welfare gains from each of four tax reforms below,
and we show how these gains depend on the assumed value of n.If the
reforms are compared on the basis of welfare gains, their relative positions
also depend on ri.As a secondary objective, we also discuss how uncertainty
in the elasticity estimate affects the expected value of the welfare gain.
In any application of equation (1), C may be measured with error. Policy
recommendations should then be based on E[W(E,. t)J,whereE is the expecta-
tions operator. Instead, analysts typically estimate W[E(c), t] in order
to employ a single estimated value for the elasticity parameter. This
shortcut is perfectly valid in the partial equilibrium model represented
by equation (1): W is a linear function of C, SO E[W(c, t)] =W[E(s),t].
Many general equilibrium studies continue to use E(c) to evaluate large
tax changes, however, including the study by Fullerton, King, Shoven, and
Whalley (1981). We investigate the size of this error by using the same
model to plot W as a function of the saving elasticity. If this relation—
ship is nearly linear, then the effect of the error is small.—4—
III. Empirical Estimates of the Saving Elasticity
An increase in the net rate of return lowers the price of future con-
sumption. The compensated quantity demanded must rise, but the percentage
increase may exceed or fall short of the percentage decrease in price.
Expenditure on future consumption (saving) may rise or fall, so the sign
of n is ambiguous.
Empirical estimates of r have hardly narrowed the range of plausible
values. "Denison's Law" states that r is zero, following Edward Denison's
(1958) observation that saving as a fraction of income in the U.S. has been
a historical constant. Econometric estimates by Michael Boskin (1978)
suggest that ri is significantly positive. Using eight different regressions,
Boskin finds values for that range from 0.2 to 0.6, but that cluster between
0.3 and 0.4. Howrey and Hymans (1978) use Boskin's data but find that esti—
mates of naresensitive to (1) the measure of expected inflation, (2) the
sample period, (3) the definition of saving, and (4) the interest rate
variable chosen for the regression. They cannot reject the hypothesis
that r is zero.
More recently, Lawrence Summers (1981) builds a model in which life-
time consumption plans depend upon intertemporal substitution in utility,
time until retirement and death, the rate of time preference, rates of
growth, and the rate of return to saving. The model is then solved for
the saving elasticity. Plausible values for these other parameters
imply values for r from 1.5 to 3.0, a range much higher than those of
the econometric estimates described above. Finally, David Starrett (1982)
shows how amendments to Summers' model could widen these bounds still further,
but he argues for values of nthatare lower than those found by Summers.-'—5—
IV. Efficiency Analysis with Several Distortions
For each different value of n, we use a computational model of the
U.S. economy and tax system to measure the welfare gains from four separate
tax reform proposals.' In the tradition of Harberger (1962, 1966), this
model abstracts entirely from the costs of implementing or administering
alternative tax proposals. It includes 19 different industries, each
with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function defined
over capital, labor, and the outputs of other industries. Capital is homo-
geneous and mobile, and it faces an ad valorem rate of tax in each industry
that reflects corporate taxes, property taxes, and personal taxes. Differ—
ing rates of tax create distortions in the allocation of capital among
industries, so efficiency can be enhanced by any reform that tends to remove
tax rate disparities. In fact, for a fixed stock of capital in any one
period, any common rate of tax on all uses of capital is nondistorting.
Each of 12 different income classes has an endowment of labor and
capital, and is assigned a nested CES utility function defined over future
consumption, present consumption, and leisure. The model allows the user
to specify any value for the wage elasticity of labor supply and any value
for the interest elasticity of saving. It then calculates parameters for
the twelve utility functions such that utility maximization behavior is
consistent with those elasticities. Government uses revenues in a balanced
budget to purchase industry outputs, to make transfer payments, and to
subsidize government enterprises. A trade sector closes the model.
Total saving in each equilibrium is used to augment the capital stock
in successive equilibria. We choose an exogenous rate of growth for effective
labor units, such that a simulation with unchanged tax rules provides a
sequence of equilibria that lies on a steady state growth path. A simula-
tion with an alternative tax rule provides a sequence of equilibria that—6—
approaches a different steady state growth path, with a different capital!
labor ratio for the economy. Intertemporal and other distortions are
then measured by comparing the discounted stream of consumption from
each sequence. Aggregate welfare differences are defined by the present
value of compensating variations, in 1973 dollars.-"
When tax rules are altered for a simulation, we scale all personal
income tax rates up or down in order to keep the government's budget
balanced at the same level of real expenditures and transfer payments.
Miy change in an industry's tax on capital thus affects intersectoral
distortions through the dispersion of tax rates by industry, intertemporal
distortions through the overall average rate of tax on capital, and labor!
leisure distortions through the personal taxes required to maintain real
revenue yields. As a consequence, the model is fully capable of second—
best efficiency analysis in a world where nondistorting taxes are generally
unavailable. In such a world, the comparative advantages of alternative
tax reforms depend on a large set of behavioral parameters. In this paper,
of course, we provide total welfare gains as a function of the saving
elasticity
4!
V. Tax Reform Simulations
To demonstrate the relationships discussed above, we select four
particular tax reforms to evaluate. Our selection is essentially arbitrary,
but we wish to look at feasible reforms that are currently under cons idera—
tion by at least some economists and policymakers.
1. Tax Imputed Rents. Homeowners earn a return to their investment
that currently escapes both corporate and personal taxation. This reform
raises the low rate of tax on capital in the housing industry, reduces—7—
the dispersion of rates, and provides an intersectoral efficiency gain. By
raising more revenue, the government can also reduce the personal income
tax distortions in labor/leisure choices. By raising the overall rate of
tax on capital, however, this reform implies intertemporal losses that
increase in importance with the saving elasticity. Figure 1 shows that
gains outweigh losses for all values of ri between zero and 0.6, but that
the net gain falls from $256 billion to $126 billion across this range of
elasticity values. Because intertemporal losses are small for low n, this
reform dominates the others for n <0.18.
2. Index Capital Gains. In the current system, taxes are paid on
40 percent of real capital gains as well as on inflationary increases in
share prices and other asset values. This reform removes inflationary
gains from the tax base and reduces the overall taxation of income from
capital. It thus provides intertemporal gains that increase with n. It
changes industry tax rates differentially and has an ambiguous impact on
intersectoral distortions, but the revenue loss requires additional dis-
torting personal taxes on labor. Figure 1 shows how the net gain increases
from $18 billion to $185 billion, but this reform by itself never dominates
all the others.
3. Integrate Income Taxes. Since industries differ in the degree to
which firms are incorporated, separate corporate taxes raise effective
rates in some industries more than others. This reform eliminates the
separate corporate tax system, but collects personal tax on retained as
well as distributed profits of corporations.It lowers the highest rates
of tax on capital and thus provides both intersectoral and intertemporal
gains. Figure 1 shows how these gains outweigh additional distortions in
the labor/leisure choice, with net gains rising from $122 to $393 billion—8--
as n is increased from zero to 0.6. Efficiency gains are larger than those
of any other reform when n is between 0.18 and 0.29.
4. Integrate and Index. This reform combines those of 2 and 3 above,
and it provides the greatest reduction of taxes on income from capital.
With a zero saving elasticity, these interteinporal gains are relatively
unimportant. The large shortfall in revenue, however, requires major
increases in personal taxes that add to important labor/leisure distor-
tions. Net gains are only $34 billion, but these increase dramatically
to $481 billion as ri increase to 0.6. For values of n >0.29,intertemporal
gains outweigh other losses by enough that this reform dominates all
others. This curve in Figure 1 is not the vertical sum of the curves
from reforms 2 and 3, because the combined revenue shortfall requires an
increase in the personal tax rate that enters quadratically in the cost of
labor/leisure distortions.
Figure 1 further indicates that the first curve is practically linear,
though slightly convex. The other three are practically linear, though
slightly concave. If the distribution of possible values for ri is symmetric
around 0.4, for example, these results indicate that the correct expected
welfare gainfromreducing taxes on capital is slightly less than the welfare
gain obtained with the use of r =0.4alone. Thus, when Fullerton, King,
Shoven, and Whalley (1981) report results for reforms 3 and 4, the effect
of this error is very small. By using only 0.4, however, they may leave the
misimpression that integration with indexing always dominates integration
alone in this model.—9—
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a general equilibrium simulation model to rank
four possible tax reforms on the basis of a measure of economic efficiency
that includes the intersectoral allocation of capital, the intertemporal
allocation of consumption, and the labor/leisure allocations of individuals.
The welfare gain from each tax reform is an almost linear function of the
saving elasticity assumed in the model, and we show the sensitivity. More-
over, even within the relatively narrow region between zero and 0.6, we
find values of the saving elasticity for which each of three different
tax reforms is ranked highest.
One interpretation of this result is that until theorists such as
Summers (1981) and Starrett (1982) agree on a concept for the saving elas-
ticity, and until econometricians such as Boskin (1978) and Howrey and
Hymans (1978) agree on an estimate for the saving elasticity, those of us
who use this parameter to simulate tax reforms cannot hope to provide unambigu-
ous recommendations. to policymakers. Furthermore, because the saving
elasticity is only one of many uncertain parameters, econometric estimates
may never be refined sufficiently to allow the ranking of policy options by
a single criterion. Instead, more attention could be paid to the distribu-
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1. Lucas (1976) suggests a further problem. Values for nareestimated
from past data, and individual behavior may adjust in response to a
policy change.
2.We provide only the briefest description of the general equilibrium
model used in this paper, because more detail is readily available
in Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981), and because great
detail will soon become available in Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven and
Whalley (1984).
3.Though the model provides some distributional results, consumer groups
are differentiated by current income rather than by lifetime earnings.
Because individuals move through several current income groups during
their lifetimes, redistribution among such groups is a poor indicator of
lifetime welfare. Finally, because capital is homogeneous and mobile
in this model, no individuals suffer immediate capital gains or losses
as the result of tax reform.
4.Welfare gains also depend upon the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to the net wage, and on the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital in production. The uncompensated labor
supply elasticity is set to 0.15 in this paper, while the substitution
elasticities are chosen for each industry from estimates in the literature.References
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